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ERIK-HANS KLIJN, JOOI' KOPPENJAN AND KATRIEN TERMEER 
Public policy usually develops in complex networks of public, quasi-public and private 
organizations. It is now generally accepted that these networks set limits to the 
governance capability of the administration. A good deal less is known about the 
opportunities which policy networks offer for tackling social and administrative 
problems. This article deals with the way network management enables government 
organizations to benefit from networks. Building on the theoretical concepts of 
'networks' and 'games', two forms of network management are identified: game 
management and network structuring. Four key aspects can be identified for both of 
these management fonns: actors and their relations, resources, rules and perceptions. At 
thesame time, criteria for the assessment and improvement of network management are 
examined. The article concludes with a consideration of the limits of network 
management. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The importance to government organizations of policy networks for the 
management of policy processes is clearly illustrated by the failure of the Dutch 
government to develop and introduce a new passport in the eighties. In 1981, the 
Dutch Parliament ratified the EC resolution in which it committed itself to the 
introduction of a new passport according to EC guidelines by 1 January 1985. 
Tenders were invited from private companies. 
Soon, the Ministries of Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs clashed with the 
result that no decision was taken regarding which company should be granted 
the assignment of developing the new passport system. The Ministry of Home 
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Affairs (MHA) represented the interests of local governments and of the state 
printing office (SDUB), the state-owned printers of the present passport. The MHA 
therefore wanted a decentralized passport system which would be developed by 
the state printing office. They felt the municipalities should be involved in the 
production and distribution of the new passport. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA), which was responsible for the introduction of the new passport, wanted a 
centralized system which would guarantee optimal protection against fraud. 
This system differed to such an extent from the old one that the MFA did not 
want the existing network of actors to develop it. It was to be developed by the 
’EP-consoflium’, which consisted of two giants, Kodak and Philips, and one 
dwarf, Elba, a small printer of hgh quality stationery. 
In 1985, the Prime Minister intervened in order to break the deadlock. He 
suggested a compromise. The passport would be distributed by the munici- 
palities and the assignment would be a joint venture involving KEP and the SDUB. 
During the next few months however, KEP and SDUB failed to reach an 
agreement. In June 1986, the MFA signed a contract with KEP: the MHA had lost 
the bureau-political battle. 
The KEP contract involved the creation of a completely new network. A special 
plant was to be set up whose exclusive task would be the development of a 
passport system according to the MFA guidelines. In January 1988, the first new 
passport was to be distributed, but before that time problems arose. Within a few 
months, Kodak resigned from the project. Because the role of Philips was rather 
marginal, Elba became the main contract partner of MFA. In the autumn of 1987, 
the M A  made every effort to acquire a specimen of the new passport in order to 
have awputable examining body assess the extent to which it was proof against 
fraud. However, since the ministry did not obtain a specimen in time, the 
introduction of the new passport had to be postponed. In the meantime, 
Parliament had become suspicious and decided to conduct an inquiry, which 
resulted in the resignation of two of the politicians responsible. In December 
1988, the contract with KEP was cancelled. Banks consequently refused to extend 
further credit, KEp went bankrupt. The responsibility for the development of a 
new passport was transferred to the MHA, which started a new passport project 
in 1990. 
Although several factors jointly responsible for the passport d6bScle have been 
suggested, one appears to be particularly important: the way the MFA managed 
the process. The MFA was wholly committed to its own design for the new 
passport system. Actors who had different ideas were excluded from the process. 
Participation was restricted to those of like mind. By creating its own network, 
the W A  expected to be able to gain absolute power over the passport 
development process. By doing so, however, it rendered itself completely 
dependent upon one other partner. When this partner failed to comply with the 
contract, the project was doomed. 
The example of the passport d6bScle illustrates that it is impossible, or at least 
precarious, to ignore the existence of networks. The network context of policy 
projects renders top-down management inadequate. Policy networks require a 
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different method of governing. However, although in policy science the idea of 
poliq7 networks as a concept for analysing policy processes has gained p o p  
ularity, little attention has been paid to the question of how policy makers can 
manage these processes. The aim of this article is to offer a theoretical exploration 
of the possibilities and limitations of management in policy networks. 
I1 POLICY NETWORKS AND POLICY GAMES 
The definition of public policy as being the result of an interaction process 
between many actors of whom only a few are government bodies has gradually 
become wideIy accepted. In policy science there is increasing interest in the idea 
of policy networks as a concept for describing and analysing the setting in which 
policy develops and is implemented (Hanf and Scharpf 1978; Rogers and 
Whetten 1982; Hanf and Toonen 1985; Kaufman et al. 1986; Hufen and Ringeling 
1990; Jordan 1990; Rhodes 1990; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Marin and Mayntz 
1991). The logical conclusion of this concept is that when a (governmental) actor 
tries to govern policy processes, he has to take the characteristics of this network 
into account. 
Networks are described in various ways. One major element common to these 
descriptions is that they concern more or less long-term relation patterns 
between dependent actors within which interactions take place (Hanf and 
Scharpf 1978; Benson 1982; Hufen and Ringeling 1990). We can describe 
networks, thus, as more or less stable patterns of social relations between mutually 
depqdent actors which form themselves around policy problems or clusters of resources 
and which are formed, maintained and changed by a series of games (cf. Klijn and 
Teisman 1991). The policy network is the more or less stable context within 
which separate games about policy decisions take place. 
What is meant by a ’game’ is a continuing, consecutive series of actions between 
different actors, conducted according to and guided by formal and informal rules, and 
which arises around issues or decisions in which actors have an interest (cf. Allison 
1971; Crozier and Friedberg 1980; Rhodes 1981). Policy forms the achieved 
outcome of these games. The cumulative effect from all the separate games 
results in specific patterns developing. In this way, policy networks arise around 
policy issues. Then in its turn the network forms the more permanent framework 
for subsequent games. 
Policy networks: some characteristics 
First and foremost, policy networks are characterized by the actors who are part 
of it and their relations with each other. An important precondition for these 
relations between actors to arise and to continue to exist is dependence. Actors 
are dependent on each other if they are unable to concIude games in a manner 
satisfactory to themselves without the cooperation of other actors. It is owing to 
this dependence that actors interact with each other. Through a consecutive 
series of interactions, a pattern of relations is established. The continuing series of 
games which take place within the network create and perpetuate a certain 
balance of resources such as powers, status, legitimacy, knowledge, information 
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and money w i t h  a network (Benson 1982; Aldrich 1979). The distribution of 
resources in turn affects future games within the network but at the same time is 
perpetuated or changed by those games. 
A network is characterized not only by its actors, their relations and the 
existing distribution of resources, but also by the prevailing rules. Rules are 
generahable procedures which are used in games. These procedures, created by 
the actors jointly in the course of interaction, regulate the separate games within 
the network without determining them (Weick 1979; Giddens 1984). Rules 
regulate the behaviourpf actors. They speclfy matters such as what is and is not 
acceptable, which positions actors may occupy, which actors may take part in 
which games, which action interconnects with whch position, in what way 
decisions or policy products should be brought about and what costs and 
benefits correlate with particular behaviour (see, for example, Ostrom 1986). 
Rules are often ambiguous and there are many rules in existence at any one time, 
which means it is not always immediately clear to the players which rules are 
applicable and how rules whch might be relevant should be interpreted. 
Furthermore these rules, in contrast to chess and soccer rules, for example, are 
not static. They are interpreted and changed during the interaction between the 
players (Morgan 1986; Giddens 1984; Burns and Flam 1987). 
Actors act on the basis of images and interpretations which they have adopted 
over a period of time. Perceptions are definitions or images of reality on the basis 
of which actors interpret and evaluate their actions and those of other actors 
(Weick 1979; Rt;in and Schon 1986; van Twist and Termeer 1991). On the basis of 
their perceptions, actors choose to participate in specific games within the 
network, they choose which objectives they anticipate achieving in those games 
and they select various strategies in those games. Networks are characterized by 
specific configurations of perceptions which are related to the history and nature 
of the network. The extent to which actors share perceptions with each other, 
however, can vary. 
The policy game 
Usually, only some of the actors from the network are involved in a game. The 
actors involved are the players in the game. Their aim in the game is to achieve 
specific objectives. To this end they employ strategies, i.e. they gear their actions 
and the objectives which they pursue to the strategic behaviour and objectives of 
other actors. A strategy is thus a cohesive series of actions whereby one's own 
desires and ambitions are linked to the assessment of the desires and ambitions 
of other actors (see also, for example, Crozier and Friedberg 1980). Generally, an 
actor will not pursue only one objective in a game, but will try to achieve various 
objectives simultaneously. The dynamics of the game also offer him the 
opportunity to discover new and interesting objectives in the course of the 
game (March and Olson 1976). 
The position of the players in the game is not only determined by their chosen 
strategies and their interactions with other actors but also by the resources from 
the network which they are able to mobilize in the game. In other words: their 
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power in the game is determined by a combination of the resources which they 
might potentially mobilize, combined with their strategic abilities to put these 
resources to use in an actual game. The power of each actor exists and remains in 
existence on account of the fact that other actors consider him to be powerful. 
Thus power, like rules, is a construct of the actors in the network. 
Policy is a result of interactions between actors in games. Policy outcomes are 
policy measures or policy products brought about in games: for instance, a 
completed motonvay, a reduction in agriculture’s waste emissions, concluding a 
legislation project, contracts or procedures being agreed between actors, but also 
non-decisions or blockades. A further characteristic of games is that they are 
highly dynamic. Uncertainty is an intrinsic characteristic of games in networks. 
This means that during the course of the game actors adjust their strategies to the 
behaviour of the other actors and that while they are playing they are acquiring 
knowledge about the feasibility of their objectives (Klijn and Teisman 1991). So, 
during the game, learning processes also occur in which actors adjust their 
objectives and perceptions to the options and opportunities perceived by them. 
The interactions between games and networks 
Networks and games are closely linked. The conceptualization chosen here was 
inspired by Giddens’ structuration theory (1984). The network forms the context 
within which games develop. It provides the resources and rules which are used 
by the actors in the games. The network structures the game without 
determining its outcome. The outcome and/or the policy are after all dependent 
onthe strategies of the players. In their turn, the outcomes of games can, in the 
long term, change the characteristics of the network. Actors can, for example, 
influence the rule structure of the network by interpreting the rules in a 
particular way. The network is not only changed by conscious efforts on the part 
of actors. Unintended effects of behaviour on the part of actors may also result in 
changes at network level. 
The network is reproduced and changed in games. Thus, the observation that 
networks are of a stable nature means, in fact, that the actors repeatedly confirm 
the distribution of the resources, the prevailing rules and the existing perceptions 
in actual games. Total stability is, theoretically speaking, highly unlikely. Rules, 
for example, are mostly ambiguous. They require an interpretation from actors in 
actual games and this contributes to the change in their content. 
I11 A MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE ON POLICY NETWORKS 
As the opening case study illustrates, the management of interaction processes in 
networks takes shape in situations in which various actors with divergent 
interests and objectives interact. Network management is aimed at improving 
game interaction and results (Koppenjan et al. 1993). Lynn argues that ’successful 
public management can be viewed as effective gamesmanship’ (Lynn 1981, p. 
145). In principle, network management does not serve a central objective, but 
has a more facilitating role. The manager may be a governmental actor, but he 
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TABLE 1 Game management and network structuring 
Key aspects: actors resources rules perceptions 
Types of management: 
game management selective mobilizing anticipating compromising 
activation resources rules and joint image 
formation 
network structur- changing changing the changing the changing norms, 
ing relations distribution rules values and 
between of resources perceptions 
actors 
may also be an actor from outside government. It is possible that the role of 
manager may be performed by someone from outside the policy network, who 
will operate as a mediator. Although the manager is concerned with the way the 
policy process develops within the network, it would be a mistake to suppose 
that he has no interests of his own at stake. It is because the manager has 
something to gain, that he is willing to invest time and resources in facilitating 
the process. 
Two types of network management 
Based on the difference between games and networks described in the previous 
section, a distinction can be made between game management and network 
structurinb. Game management concerns the influencing of interaction processes 
betweeq actors, which involves anticipating the limitations and opportunities 
which occur within the network. In game management, the manager considers 
the characteristics of the network as a given. Network structuring on the other 
hand, is aimed at effecting changes within the network (cf. OToole 1988). 
The network manager has four key aspects available to him on each level for 
influencing games and networks: actors, resources, rules and perceptions. Table I 
shown above gives an outline of the key aspects for management at game level 
and network level and the corresponding activities. These activities will be 
further developed in sections IV and V. 
IV 
INTERACTION 
Game management is aimed at integrating the actors, resources and perceptions 
present within the network, bearing in mind the prevailing interaction rules and 
the distribution of resources. By strategic anticipation of the obstacles and 
opportunities present within the network, an attempt is made to promote the 
conditions for joint action or for creating common products. The activities 
indicated by the term game management are outlined below. They are iUustrated 
by examples drawn from the decision making concerning the expansion of 
Schiphol, the Dutch National Auport. 
GAME MANAGEMENT: PROMOTING AND IMPROVING 
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Expanding Schiphol Airport 
Together with the port of Rotterdam, Schiphol Airport is the 'engine' of the 
Dutch economy. Until recently, the expansion of the airport occurred more or less 
autonomously: there was no planned coordination with developments in the 
local environment. For instance, because municipalities were not involved in the 
planning process for the airport, they built houses in places that were later to 
become badly situated in relation to the airport. The expansion of Schiphol's 
activities conflicted increasingly with the quality of life in the area. Noise has 
tradition9lly been an important problem, but over the years, problems such as 
external safety, soil and air pollution reached the policy agenda. 
In 1986, in an effort to keep up with international competition, the airport 
executive presented the 'Schiphol master plan' for the further expansion of 
Schiphol in order for it to become one of the few airports in Europe with Main 
Port status. This involved more than a doubling of the number of passengers and 
the building of a fifth runway. The government supported this target on the 
condition that it was linked to a second goal: the solving of the environmental 
problems which would accompany such an expansion. The Ministry of Housing, 
Physical Planning and Environment (VROM) coordinated efforts to develop a 
plan which would accommodate both targets. 
In 1988, a project organization was set up in which relevant parties were 
invited to participate. It included members from the ministries of VROM, Home 
Affairs, Transport, Public Works and Water Management, and Economic Affairs, 
t2;le province of North Holland, the municipalities of Haarlemmermeer and 
Amsterdam, the Executive of Schiphol A q o r t  and Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM). 
Environmental groups and representatives of the local residents, however, were 
not invited. The project began in September 1989, with the signing of a joint 
declaration of intent, whereby the participants committed themselves to 
developing a joint plan with regard to the two targets. 
Subsequently, participants exchanged information about their preferences, and 
research was carried out into possible scenarios and their impacts. Two coalitions 
took shape: the province of North Holland and the municipality of 
Haarlemmermeer formed the environmental coalition, and the other participants 
the Main Port coalition. VROM had to adopt a neutral position in order to 
perform the role of coordinator, and could therefore not openly support the 
environmental coalition. An attempt to get a joint plan of action accepted failed. 
Another procedure had to be found. Under the chairmanship of the secretary- 
general of the VROM (the most highly placed civil servant in that ministry) a 
selected group of participants negotiated specific issues and their proposals were 
presented to the other members of the project. If these were not accepted, the 
process was repeated until they were. In this way a plan of action was 
formulated on which all the parties agreed. In April 1991, after some final 
wheeling and dealing, this plan was accepted by all the parties involved. 
The plan included a guided expansion of the airport, the rerouting of the forth 
runway and the construction of the fifth. The capacity of the airport would be 
used in such a way that noise nuisance would be limited. The demolition of a 
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number of houses and the insulation of others was also agreed on. Furthermore, 
the agreement included a number of measures in the field of external safety, 
transport and regonal development. It was estimated that the plans would cost 
about 22 billion gdders. 
As a result of this network management, the first step was taken towards the 
coordinated planning of the future development of Schphol. It proved to be 
possible to decide jointly on a plan in a way which might benefit all parties. 
Although the Main Port coalition had had to accept limits to expansion, it might 
nevertheless s i n  because of the reduction in the risk of political mobilization. 
There were also potential benefits for the environmental coalition, i.e. the 
reduction in environmental damage. Without interaction, the environmental 
situation in the area surrounding the airport might have been even worse. 
Although the results of the project have been promising to date, further success is 
not assured. For instance, a number of important issues, such as night flights, still 
need to be resolved. Strategies of game management are discussed in more detail 
below. 
Selective activation of actors 
In a policy network there are a variety of actors at work. These actors have 
diverse interests, perceptions and resources. Starting from these different 
positions they are involved in processes w i t h  the network. This does not 
mean that they play a role in each process or each game. Game management can 
involve the inclusion or non-inclusion of actors in policy games. To that end, 
potential relations between actors need to be activated or blocked. This strategy 
is referred to as 'selective activation' (Scharpf 1978; Friend et al. 1974). By means 
of selective activation, the formation of restraining or driving coalitions with 
regard to specific policy proposals can be strengthened or weakened and 
blockades can be set up, avoided or broken through. 
The success of selective activation depends on a correct assessment of which 
actors are essential to joint action and the willingness of actors to invest their 
resources (Scharpf 1978; OToole 1988). Actors can be essential because they have 
an indispensable resource at their disposal, or because their participation confers 
a desired excess value on the joint action. Actors are undesirable if their presence 
is not strictly necessary but actually hampers joint action. Furthermore, actors 
can have at their disposal 'veto power', which affords them the option of 
blocking interaction processes (cf. Kingdon 1984; Marsh and Rhodes 1992, pp. 
249-68). 
In the case of Schiphol, the actors relevant to both targets (further development 
of the airport and the safeguarding of the quality of life in the environment) were 
activated in order to facilitate the coordinated expansion of the airpcrt, and 
resulting in a project organization in which 16 parties cooperated. Although this 
ensured the articulation of a variety of interests and issues, it made joint 
decision-making difficult. Therefore a second round of selective activation 
became necessary in which the number of participants was limited. This was 
effected by creating a working group ('the Inner Circle') within the project 
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organization. And then, of course, there was the problem of the environmental 
pressure groups and representatives of local residents which were not invited to 
participate. This means that in a future round of decision making, these groups 
will have to be involved. However, because they are not committed to the joint 
plan of action, reaching an agreement will not be easy. 
Mobilization of resources 
There is a specific distribution of resources within a network. Strategic 
anticipatiq of resources demands an exact assessment of the importance of 
specific resources to the progress and quality of a particular game. The actors 
who were invited to join the project organization for Schiphol were selected on 
the basis of their official positions, their expertise, their commitment to the two 
targets and their capacity to contribute to the creation of political and societal 
support. 
Closely linked to this is the problem of how necessary resources can be 
mobilized. Mobilizing resources often has its price. Brinpg resources and their 
'administrators' together in one game, moreover, can cause complications. One 
possible solution to this is provided by the mobilization of 'supporters', i.e. 
tapping resources without the administrators of those resources actively 
participating in the game (Teisman 1992). If the price of mobilizing certain 
resources or actors is considered too high, replacement of resources can be 
sought. This assumes that actors do not have a monopoly on particular resources 
wkreby they cannot be passed by. In the case of Schiphol this was effected by 
deciding to let the environmentalists' viewpoint be represented by governmental 
organizations instead of pressure groups. 
The use of interaction rules 
In a game, players use rules. Some of these rules are known and are used 
consciously. Other rules are followed unconsciously, but are no less compulsory. 
The manager has to be aware of the prevailing rules, because contravening them 
disrupts the relations between actors and can lead to blockades in interaction. 
Knowledge of the rules of the network also makes it possible, based on a number 
of things that can be regarded as 'obvious', to get games underway quickly and, 
if necessary, to terminate them. 
In the case of Schiphol, the interaction between participants regarding such a 
strategic issue as the future expansion of the airport was a relatively new 
experience. Adequate routines for interaction were lacking. This meant that at 
the start of the process a great deal of energy had to be invested in the 
development of rules. This was effected by the use of arrangements such as the 
signing of a joint declaration of intent and a joint plan of action. At certain points 
in the process, the way interactions were organized became the subject of explicit 
decision making, for instance when it was decided to establish a working group. 
In order to play the new game, new rules had to be developed. One may surmise 
that these rules will eventually become institutionalized and thus part of the 
network. 
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Managing perceptions 
Actors’ perceptions about problems and situations are often divergent. In order 
to achieve a specific policy objective it may be necessary to harmonize the actors’ 
perceptions (cf. Rein and Schon 1986). This is made possible by an exchange of 
objectives, executing ’package deals’ or - in the case of incompatible objectives - 
’agreeing to disagree’. If objectives are not mutually exclusive it is possible to 
acheve ’consensus building’ (OToole 1988; H a d  and OToole 1992). 
One way out of conflicts and deadlocks may involve actors abandoning their 
original positioq and pursuing new goals which will benefit both parties. By 
redefining the issues it is possible in many cases to convert win-lose or lose-lose 
situations into win-win situations. The game manager wdl do his best to achieve 
such a redefining of the aim of the game (Forrester 1989). 
M a n a p g  perceptions was crucial to the Schiphol project. One implication of 
attempting to accommodate the two seemingly conflicting targets was that 
parties had to change their perceptions about their interests and goals and the 
ways to pursue them. Because the targets were formulated in general terms, 
there was room for participants to look for common ground for decision making. 
This process was structured by the formation of the working group (the Inner 
Circle) in which members’ conflicting perceptions were confronted. The results of 
this confrontation were meticulously communicated to the other members of the 
project organization. By correlating various problems, goals and measures, a 
package deal was created. The package deal meant that actors had to accept that 
they coujd not optimize their interests. It then became possible to find courses of 
action from which everybody would benefit. 
V NETWORK STRUCTURING: CHANGING THE NETWORK 
In this section the strategies of network structuring which are available to the 
network manager will be discussed: strategies aimed at changing the relations 
between actors, the existing distribution of resources, the prevailing interaction 
rules and the existing perceptions. They are illustrated by the case of the 
renovation of post-war housing in the Dutch city of Groningen. 
Renovation of post-war housing in Groningen 
In the mid-eighties, the renewal of the prewar housing areas in Groningen, a 
medium-sized city of 170,000 inhabitants in the north of the Netherlands, had 
almost been completed. The renewal of these areas was based on the concept of 
‘building in the interests of the neighbourhood. This meant a careful 
improvement of the existing dwellings for the original residents. The aim was 
to minimize the demolition of dwellings and to keep the new rents as low as 
possible. The renovations were carried out as a project: one by one, blocks of 
dwellings were improved mainly by renovating the existing dwellings. 
The renewal of the prewar housing areas took place within a well organized 
local housing network. The actors of this network were sections of the 
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Department of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment, housing 
associations, tenant organizations, politicians, local estate agencies, financial 
organizations, developers, architects and research organizations. 
In one of the neighbourhoods, which consisted of prewar and post-war 
dwellings, a project group wluch also coordinated the improvement of the pre- 
war d w e h g s  started renovating those constructed post-war. They used the 
same procedures for the post-war dwellings as they had used for the prewar 
dwellings. However, dissatisfaction with this method of improvement arose in 
the project group, which mainly consisted of civil servants. Improvements were 
mainly carried out on the outside (insulation) although some limited 
improvements on the inside were also made. The housing association and the 
civil servants concluded that the dwellings remained much as they had been: 
relatively small and basic. The improvements which were made did little to 
enhance their popularity on the local housing market. 
In September 1987, spurred on by this discontent, the project group came up 
with a radical new idea for improving the next block; an idea which had the 
support of the local council executive. The project group proposed demolishing 
the block of dwellings together with a number of the adjoining blocks and 
changing the layout of the neighbourhood. This idea constituted a radical break 
from the proposals that had been made so far and with the existing, mainly 
prewar, urban renewal traditions. There were vociferous protests from local 
residents. The social democratic party, which held a dominant position on the 
council, agreed with the tenants. Eventually, in 1988, the local council rejected the 
project group's proposal. 
This blockage in the decision-making process was the reason why the local 
Physical Planning and Housing Department initiated a broad-based process 
which triggered a discussion on what was to be done about the post-war 
neighbourhoods. After a period of research and intensive interaction between all 
parties, in late 1989 a concept policy document was produced in which the 'new 
policy' was laid down. Its main aims were to increase the differentiation of the 
housing stock in post-war neighbourhoods (in price, size and dwelling type) by 
implementing more radical improvements and by building new dwellings. 
Following discussions and negotiations with housing associations, the document 
was accepted by the local council in early 1991. 
In addition, a new way of decision making was agreed by the various parties. 
The resultant policy document was to constitute the basis for a policy process at 
neighbourhood level in which plans were made for each post-war neighbour- 
hood which form the basis of the renovation of these areas. The drawing up of 
the plans was to be a concerted effort by all the actors concerned. Housing 
associations would perform a coordinating role in this process. In the period 
between 1991 and 1993, plans were made for all eight post-war neighbourhoods. 
On the whole, neighbourhood plans were drawn up in relative harmony. In 1993 
and 1994, almost all the neighbourhood plans were passed with little problem by 
the local council. The deadlock which had existed in 1988 was chiefly resolved by 
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effecting a radical change in the perceptions of the actors on renovating post-war 
neighbourhoods and by developing new decision procedures. Some of these 
strategies will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
Changing the relations between actors 
Network structuring can deal with relations between actors within a network. In 
addition, it can involve introducing new actors and excluding others or changmg 
the relations between actors. The introduction or exclusion of actors can affect the 
relations between actors within the network. It can result in closed strongholds 
being broken open, offer scope for new ideas and enable new coalitions to form. 
Furthermore, this kind of change at the policy network level does not necessarily 
make itself felt in every game. The exclusion of actors, though, is not always easy 
to achieve, owing to rights whch might be founded on long-standing practices. 
Changing the relations between actors can occur in various ways. Usually it is 
effected by estabhhing or changing long-term organizational arrangements 
which affect a number of games within the network. Arrangements in the 
framework of network structuring might be, for example, the introduction of 
consultation procedures, the establishment of advisory bodies, entering into 
long-term or extensive contracts or the setting up of public or private legal 
persons. 
In the case of renovating post-war housing, the local council used this strategy 
of introducing new actors or explicitly changing relationship between actors. The 
most important strategy was the attempt to create a smoothly functioning 
tenants association at neighbourhood level. Until 1988, only small tenants 
associations existed but no organization was available which could present the 
interests of tenants in a specific neighbourhood. Local government tried to create 
such neighbourhood tenants associations by offering all kinds of (subsidy) 
facilities. In almost every neighbourhood, the forming of a unified tenants 
association at neighbourhood level occurred very quickly. In all the neighbour- 
hoods these newly created organisations participated in policy processes. This 
gave the policy processes at neighbourhood level a strong legitimacy and 
facihtated the acceptance of the plans by the local council. 
Changing the distribution of resources 
Changing the distribution of resources within the network is aimed at effecting 
changes in the position of actors in the policy network by bringing about changes 
in the resources which they have at their disposal: money, formal positions, 
manpower, information, expertise and legitimacy. 
Influencing the resources in the network can be done in several ways. 
Influencing the resource information can take place by, for example, introducing 
new data systems or linking existing systems. Thus, legalizing the linking of 
databases will strengthen the position of various public services in combating the 
abuse of social services. Expertise and skills can be strengthened by means of 
training and schooling. Strengthening the legitimacy of actors or the support 
which they get can take diverse forms. For instance, the government can 
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recognize an organization as a discussion partner, give this organization access 
to permanent consultative bodies or even grant the organization a legal 
monopoly. 
Strategies to influence the distribution of resources were not a dominant 
feature in the case of renovating post-war housing in Groningen. Nevertheless, 
some strateges can be identified which were aimed at effecting minor changes in 
the resource division. Several subsidy instruments were developed to make the 
policy process concerning the neighbourhood plans more attractive. Besides the 
fact tha; funds were reserved for neighbourhood improvements (on condition 
that concrete plans were submitted) there was also the possibility for tenants 
associations to receive subsidies for special activities. These subsidies, which in 
principle were reserved use over a long period, were intended as an incentive for 
various actors to participate in the policy process at neighbourhood level. 
Changing interaction rules 
In spite of the attention focused on the concept of rules (Bums and Ham 1987; 
Ostrom 1986), the form of management which involves the influencing of 
interaction rules has received little attention. The idea underlying this concept is 
that it is possible to steer a process in a particular direction by influencing the 
interaction rules. Given that actors are often only partly conscious of the rules 
which determine their behaviour, and that changing the rules is usually a long- 
winded affair, interaction rules are often difficult to influence. 
In the case study, the idea of 'steering by means of procedures' was practised 
in the sense that new procedures for decision malung were agreed upon. But 
, implicit attempts were also made to change the more informal rules of the 
network. It used to be standard procedure for new initiatives on renovation to be 
taken by the local Physical Planning and Housing Department. By allowing 
housing associations to take the initiative in developing neighbourhood plans, 
the department, supported by the local council executive, tried to call into 
question the 'given nature' of this informal rule and to stimulate housing 
associations to take new initiatives. 
Changing nonns, values and perceptions 
Network management can also deal with changing the existing values, norms 
and perceptions of the actors witlun the network. By directing 'internalization 
processes', the manager can attempt to steer the values and perceptions of a 
target group in the desired direction (In 't Veld 1991). 
In addition to persuasion strategies, network management can address itself to 
the organizing or promoting of an 'open debate' (Majone 1986, p. 457). A more 
radical, 'tougher' method is that of reframing. Reframing is an intervention 
which stimulates the actors involved to put their own frame of reference (frame) 
into perspective and to consider a situation or relation from another frame of 
reference. Reframing is aimed at effecting an illogcal, irrational leap which can 
be compared to a 'paradigmatic shift'. 'The approach' results in changing 
perceptions, behaviour and relations', according to Levy and Merry (1986, p. 96). 
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Reframing can be effected by simulations or by organizing a confrontation 
between actors with new points of view. Stnking, shocking events often serve as 
a ’trigger’ for reframing, whether consciously directed or not. 
In the case study, reframing strategies were important. In fact, one of the major 
causes of the initial blockade in the decision making on post-war neighbour- 
hoods were the differences between the various actors‘ perceptions on 
renovation. Generally speaking, it can be said that in the beginning most 
parties had a ’technical orientation’ towards renovating post-war neighbour- 
hoods. This orientation emphasized the technical defects of the housing stock 
and was aimed at making low investments to improve those defects. Conflicts 
arose when a new orientation became dominant. This ‘housing market 
orientation’ stressed the problem that the post-war dwellings did not meet with 
their inhabitants‘ preferences and could only satisfy the housing preferences of a 
very small group of inhabitants who had low incomes. This meant that more 
radical measures for changing the housing stock of a neighbourhood sometimes 
needed to be taken. The local Physical Planning and Housing Department 
succeeded in legitimizing t b  new orientation by means of an intensive process 
of research coupled with interaction between all the important actors within the 
network. 
VI ASSESSMENT OF AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NETWORK 
MANAGEMENT 
Notwithstanding the previous arguments, there still remains the question of 
what should be understood by ’good’ network management and which criteria 
should be employed in determining this. The problem with answering this 
question is that actors pursue different objectives whch, moreover, can change in 
the course of the policy process. For this reason, the achieving of objectives 
cannot be a guiding criterion in structuring and assessing network management. 
In this section a number of norms will be formulated which emphasize the 
quality of policy processes. 
Based on the idea that networks are often characterized by cooperation 
problems caused by the lack of a dominant decision centre, network manage- 
ment is considered a success if it promotes cooperation between actors and 
prevents, by-passes or removes the blockades which obstruct that cooperation. 
This can be effected by talung advantage of the opportunities and avoiding the 
threats which can occur at game level and through actively mfluencing 
opportunities and threats at the level of the network and its environment. This 
general norm for assessing network management i s  further developed below 
based on six properties which are required of ’good’ network management. 
8 
1 Achieving win-win situations 
Instead of concentrating on one actor achieving his objective, network 
management needs to address itself to bringing about a situation which 
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represents an improvement on the starting position for all those concerned. This 
does not mean that all those involved wdl achieve their objectives to the same 
extent. In many cases it will not be possible to give all the actors a feeling of 
winning. In such cases, a situation can be fostered which makes non- 
participation in interactions less attractive than participation (Dery 1984; 
Teisman 1992, p. 96). Good management contributes to the stimulation of 
interactions which will lead to such a situation, and to the breaking through of 
deadlocks which prevent the achieving of win-win situations. 
2 Activating actors and resources 
Interaction assumes that actors are willing to invest their resources in a joint 
process. This means that they need to realize the attractiveness of that interaction 
process. Network management needs to be aimed at promoting that willingness 
and should therefore stimulate enthusiasm. 
# 
3 Limiting interaction costs 
The costs of interaction should be kept within reasonable hu t s .  If interaction 
leads to endless squabbling or trench warfare it can cause participation in the 
interaction to result in a waste of resources and energy. It is necessary to prevent 
actors pulling out in disillusionment after an enthusiastic start. Interaction costs 
should be proportionate to the stake in the game. Network management should 
be aimed at restructuring, avoiding or ending interactions which lead to win-lose 
or, lose-lose situations (Koppenjan 1993). In addition, good management of 
conflicts makes heavy demands on network management. Suppressing conflicts 
threatens the quality and transparency of the interaction. Regulation should 
prevent conflicts becoming dysfunctional and destructive (Termeer 1993). 
4 Procuring commitment 
In addition to mobilizing actors and resources, network management needs to 
induce those involved to make a commitment to the joint undertaking. Without 
this 'voluntary binding', cooperation threatens to founder on the strategic 
uncertainties which play a role in collective action: the danger that the impact 
of actions will be shifted onto others or that actors wdl pull out at crucial 
moments and leave others with the risks (Olsen 1965). By procuring a form of 
commitment to the collective action, this danger of withdrawal can be curbed. 
This commitment from the parties concerned can consist of informal agreements, 
or of more formal arrangements entering into convenants or contracts or the 
establishing of autonomous legal persons (Teisman 1992). 
5 Political-administrative management 
In network management particular attention needs to be focused on political 
commitment. The functioning of networks, indeed, is sometimes seen as posing a 
threat to the position of representative bodies such as municipal councils, the 
Provincial States and Parliament (Hufen and Ringehg 1990, p. 251). The 
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existence of policy networks does not mean, however, that representative bodies 
are by definition excluded. On the contrary, they are often part of networks. For 
this reason, good political-administrative management is a part of network 
management. It is particularly important to link up the various games in which 
representative bodies are involved with the games which are being played 
elsewhere in the network. The quality of political-administrative management 
stands or falls by the manager's 'feeling' for determining which information is 
relevant and for choosing the correct moment for political-administrative 
harmonization attempts. 
6 The quality and openness of the interaction 
Network management needs to do justice to the quality and openness of the 
interaction within networks (Majone 1986). After all, one of the dangers 
connected with the functioning of networks is that external effects are produced 
which are damaging in the longer term, both to those involved within the 
network and to others not represented within the network. Furthermore, it is 
necessary to prevent a stranglehold consensus emerging within the network 
which results in 'groupthink' type situations in which criticism is not accepted 
and risks and the external impact of decisions are ignored, with all the 
concomitant repercussions (Janis 1982; 't Hart 1990). 
. 
VII 
Management in policy networks requires a great deal of patience and a feeling 
for the rklations and the options which can be found within the network. The 
network manager has limited resources at his disposal and is dependent on 
others. Not all key aspects are equally easy for him to influence. His attempts to 
influence can be neutralized by the strategies of others. His efforts to improve 
interaction processes can be in vain. 'fie margins for network management are 
not always wide. Moreover, the manager is himself part of the network and has 
his own interests, values and perceptions. This complicates his relation with the 
other actors. 
On the other hand, he can undertake attempts to influence, in the same way as 
other actors, whch means he is not powerless. HIS interventions can promote 
interaction, help to restructure the direction of interaction processes and 
introduce new values, ideas and actors. Network management cannot guarantee 
better interaction development and better policy outcome but does increase the 
chances of these things occurring. The opportunities for network management 
should not be underestimated, either. The fact that many actors are involved in 
policy processes in networks affords the manager the scope to introduce his own 
ideas and reactivate stagnating processes. Furthermore, the influence of the - 
often indirect - management strategies dealt with here, could well be much 
more radical and far-reaching than those of the classical, more short-term 
oriented, direct strategies. 
THE MARGINS OF NETWORK MANAGEMENT 
I 
0 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1995 
MANAGING PUBLIC SECTOR NETWORKS 453 
REFERENCES 
Agranoff R.I. 1986. Intergovernmental management. Human services problem-solving in six metropolitan 
Aldrich, H.A. 1979. Organizations and environments. Englewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall. 
Allison, G.T. 1971. Essence of decision. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 
Benson, J.K. 1982. 'A framework for policy analysis' in Rogers and Whetten (eds.) (see below). 
Burns, T.R. and H. Flam. 1957. The shaping of sock1 organization; social rule system theory with application. 
Crozier, M. and E. Friedberg. 1980. Actors and systems; the politics of collective action. Chicago and 
Dery, D: 1984. Problem definition in policy analysis. Kansas: University Press of Kansas. 
Forester, J. 1989. Planning in the face of power. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Friend, J.K., J.M. Power and C.J.L. Yewlett. 1974. Public planning: the inter-corporate dimension. London: 
Tavistock. 
Gage, R.W. and M.P. Mandell. 1990. Strategies for managing intergovernmental policies and networks. New 
York and London: Praeger. 
Giddens, A. 1984. The constiution ofsociety; outline of the theory ofstucturation. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press. 
Hanf, K. and F.W. Scharpf. 1978. Interorganizational policy making; limits to coordination and central 
control. London: Sage. 
Had, K. and Th.A.J. Toonen. 1985. Policy implementation in federal and unitary systems. Dordmht, 
Boston and Lancaster: Khwer. 
Hanf, K. and L. O'Toole. 1992. 'Revisiting old friends: networks, implementation structures and 
the management of interorganizational relations' European Journal of Political Research 21, 
163430. 
Hart, P. 't. 1990. Groupthink in government. A study of small groups and guuernmental failure. Amsterdam 
and,Lisse. 
Hjern, 8. and D.O. Porter. 1981. '1mpler.entation structures: a new unit for administrative analysis', 
qganizational Studies 3, 211-37. 
Hufen, J.A.M. and A.B. Ringeling. 1990. Beleidsnetwerken: Ouerheids-, semi- overheids- en particuliere 
organisaties in wisselwerking, [Policy networks: Interaction of government, quasi-government and private 
organizations]. 's-Gravenhage: Vuga. 
Janis, LL. 1982. Groupthink: psychological studies of policy decisions and fuIscos. Boston: Houghton Miffh. 
Jordan, G. 1990. 'Sub-governments, policy communities and networks; refilling old bottles?', Journal of 
Reoretical Politics 2, 319-38. 
Kaufmann, EX., G. Majone and V. Ostrom (eds.). 1986. Guidance, control and eualuation in the public 
sector. Berlin and New York De Gruyter. 
Kingdon, J.W. 1984. Agendas, alternatives and public policies. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and 
Company. 
Klijn, E.H. 1995. 'Analysing and managing policy networks: a theoretical examination of the concept 
policy network and its problems', Administration and Society (forthcoming). 
KIijn, E.H., and G.R. Teisman. 1991. 'Effective policy making in a multi-actor setting: networks and 
steering' pp. 99-112 in: In't Veld et al. (see below). 
Koppenjan, J.F.M. 1993. Management van de beleidsvorming. €en studie naar de totstandkoming van beleid op 
het terrein van het binnenlands bestuur, [Managing the policy-making process. A study of public policy 
formation in the field of home administration]. 'sGravenhage: W G A .  
Kopppenjan, J.F.M., J.A de Bruijn and W.J.M. Kickert (eds.) 1993. Netwerkmanagement in het Openbaar 
Bestuur, [Network Management in the public sector], The Hague: W G A .  
Levy, A. and U. Merry. 1986. Organizational transformation. New York Praeger. 
Lynn, L.E. 1981. M a n a p g  the public business. New York: Basic Books, hc.  
Majone, G. 1986. 'Mutual adjustment by debate and persuasion pp. 445-58, in EX. Kaufman et al. (see 
areas. Albany, New York State University of New York Press. 
London: Sage. 
London: Unjversity of Chicago Press. 
above) 
0 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1995 
454 ERIK-HANS KLIJN, JOOP KOPPENJAN AND KATRIEN TERMEER 
Mandell, M.P. 1988 'Intergovernmental management in interorganizational networks' International 
-. 1990. 'Network management: strategic behaviour in the public sector, pp. 35-51, in R.W. Gage 
March, J.G. and J.F. Olsen. 1976. Ambiguity and choice in organizations. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget. 
Marin, 8. and R. Mayntz (eds.). 1991. Policy networks. Empirical evidence and theoretical considerations. 
Marsh, D. and R.A.W. Rhodes (eds.). 1992. Policy nehuorks in British Government. Oxford: Clarendon 
Morgan, G. 1986. Images of organizations. London: Sage. 
Olsen, M. 1965. The logic of collective action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Ostrom, E. 1986. 'A method of institutional analysis', pp, 459-79, in Kaufman, Majone and Ostrom 
(see above). 
(YToole, L.J. 1988. 'Strategies for intergovernmental management: implementing programs in 
interorganizational networks', Znternational Journal of Public Administration 11, 4, 41741. 
Rein, M. and D. Schon. 1986. 'Frame reflective policy discourse', Beleidsanalyse 4,4-19. 
Rhodes, R.A.W. 1981. Control and puwer in central and local relations. Famborough Gower. 
-. 1990. 'Policy networks a British perspective', Journal of Theoretical Politics. 2, 3, 295317. 
Ripley, R.B. and G. Franklin. 1987. (1st ed. 1976) Congress, the bureaucracy and public policy. Dorsey: 
Homewood. 
Rogers, D.L. and D.A. Whetten (eds.). 1982. Interorganizational coordination: theo y, research and 
implementation, Ames: Iowa State University. 
Scharpf, F.W. 1978. 'Interorganizational policy studies: issues, concepts and perspectives', pp. 345-70 
in Hanf and Scharpf (see above). 
Scharpf, F.W., 8. Reissert, and F. Schnabel. 1978. 'Policy effectiveness and confict avoidance in 
intergovenunental policy formation' pp. 57-114, in Hanf and Scharpf (see above). 
Teisman, G.R. 1992. Complexe Besluitvorming; een pluricentrisch perspectief op besluitvorming over 
ruimtelijp investeringen, [Complex Decision making; a pluricentric perspective on decision making on 
spatial investments]. 's-Gravenhage: VUGA. 
Termeer, C.J.A.M. 1993. Dynamiek en inerfie rondom mesfbeleid; een studie naar veranderingsprocessen in het 
varkenshouderijnetwerk, [Dynamics and inertia in the Dutch manure policies; a study of change processes in 
the pig firming network]. 's6ravenhage: W G A .  
Twist, M.J.W. van and C.J.A.M. Termeer. 1991. 'Introduction to configuration approach; a process 
theory for societal steering', pp. 19-30 in In 't Veld et al. (see below). 
Veld, R. in 't. 1991. 'Autopiesis, configuration and steering: impossibility theorem or dynamic 
steering theory' in Veld et al. (see below). 
Veld, R. in 't, L. Schaap, C.J.A.M. Termeer and M.J.W. van Twist (eds.). 1991. Autopoiesis and 
configuration theory: new approaches to societal steering. Dordrecht and Boston and London: Muwer 
Academic Publishers. 
Journal of Public Administration 11, 4, 393416. 
and M.P. Mandell (see above). 
Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag. 
PreSS. 
Weick, K.E. 1979. The social psychology of organizing. (2nd edn.) New York Addison Wesley. 
Received 11 July 1994. Accepted 13 February 1995. 
0 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1995 
